

Message Text

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TO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

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E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT:MBFR: THIRD REVISED DRAFT OF SPC VERIFICATION PAPER

REFERENCES: A. NATO 0241, B. 0236

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

1. NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. WE CAN ACCEPT ALTERNATIVE

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LANGUAGE PROPOS ED IN PARA 3, REFTEL A.

2. VERIFYING STABILIZING MEASURES. WE BELIEVE THE PRIMARY TASK OF THE MOBILE TEAMS SHOULD BE THE MONITORING OF FORCE LEVELS. LINKING VERIFICATION WITH STABILIZING MEASURES CREATES PROBLEMS WE WOULD PREFER TO AVOID: FOR EXAMPLE, SUGGESTING THAT THE MOBILE TEAMS COULD DETECT VIOLATIONS OF STABILIZING MEASURES COULD BE QUICKLY TRANSLATED INTO A DEMAND THAT SUCH A RESPONSIBILITY BE PLACED UPON THEM. RECOMMEND YOU STATE OUR CASE ONCE AGAIN: THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT ENOUGH TO GET SOVIETS TO AGREE TO AN INSPECTION SCHEME WHICH COULD EFFECTIVELY MONITOR FORCE LEVELS WITHOUT ADDING BURDEN OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH STABILIZING MEASURES. YOU MIGHT THEN ADD THAT MOBILE TEAMS OPERATING IN WP COUNTRIES IN NGA COULD PROBABLY DETECT MANY SIGNIFICANT OR THREATENING VIOLATIONS OF AN AGREEMENT ON STABILIZING MEASURES AND THAT EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS ITSELF CONTAINS AN ELEMENT OF VERIFICATION.

FOR ABOVE REASONS, WE BELIEVE YOU SHOULD SEEK TO CONVINCE ALLIES THAT WHILE VERIFICATION SYSTEM COULD HELP IN MONITORING SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF A STABILIZING MEASURES AGREEMENT, THEY SHOULD AGREE TO PUT FORWARD ALLIED VERIFICATION PROPOSALS TO THE WARSAW PACT AS A SYSTEM WHICH RELATED ONLY TO REDUCTIONS. TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD VERY PROBABLY DECREASE SOVIET RECEPTIVITY TO ANY VERIFICATION SCHEME AS WELL AS TO THE PROPOSED STABILIZATION MEASURES THEMSELVES.

3. MEASURES OUTSIDE THE NGA. (PARA 5, REF A, PARA 9, REF B) YOUR APPROACH TO COUNTERING THE FLANK ARGUMENTS APPEARS SOUND. YOU SHOULD STRESS THE ELEMENT OF RECIPROCITY FOR THE PACT IN CONTACTS WITH INDIVIDUAL FLANK DELEGATIONS. WE THINK THE TOLERANCE OF FLANK COUNTRIES FOR THE KIND OF INSPECTION THEY PROPOSE WOULD BE LOW.

4. LIAISON OFFICERS. (PARA 6, REF A, PARA 10, REF B, BONN 1055) WE BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENCE OF PACT LIAISON OFFICERS WITH NATO TEAMS COULD ENABLE THE PACT TO LEARN A GOOD DEAL ABOUT THE MONITORING CAPABILITIES OF BOTH THE INSPECTORS AND THE NATIONAL MEANS WHICH WOULD BE USED,

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IN PART, TO DIRECT THEIR ACTIVITIES. IN SHORT, THE PACT COULD USE ITS LIAISON OFFICERS TO LEARN HOW BEST TO CHEAT. SURVEILLANCE OR TAILING COULD ALSO HELP THEM TO THIS END, BUT NOT AS MUCH AS CONTINUAL AND REQUIRED OBSERVATION OF THE INSPECTORS AT WORK. BECAUSE THE PACT NEED PLACE LESS RELIANCE ON INSPECTORS TO VERIFY NATO COMPLIANCE, THE NET ADVANTAGE OF LIAISON TEAMS WOULD BE WITH THEM --TO NATO'S DETRIMENT.

5. FURTHER, WE THINK THERE ARE MANY SUBTLE WAYS A LIAISON OFFICER SYSTEM FOR TOURING TEAMS CAN BE USED TO FRUSTRATE THE WORK OF THE TEAMS WITHOUT CREATING THE PRIMA FACIE CASE OF "INTERFERENCE" THAT UK REP LOGAN IS LOOKING FOR. IF THE TIME COMES THAT THE PACT HAS SOMETHING TO HIDE, THEY WILL PRESUMABLY FRUSTRATE THE WORK OF THE INSPECTORS (IF NECESSARY) BY VARIOUS TACTICS, PROVIDING THE EVIDENCE FOR "PUBLIC OPINION" THE UK WANTS. UNDER A LISAISON SYSTEM, THE PACT COULD -- WE THINK -- DIRECT THEIR TOURING TEAMS TO TAKE ACTIONS WHICH NATO LIAISON OFFICERS WOULD HAVE TO PREVENT LEADING TO CHARGES AND COUNTER-CHARGES CONFUSING TO "PUBLIC OPVNION."

6. IN SHORT, WE WANT TO HOLD THE LINE ON THIS ONE FOR PRACTICAL REASONS, AND HOPE THE FRG WILL COME TO SEE THAT IT HAS MORE TO GAIN IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FROM THE FREEST POSSIBLE ACCESS TO EASTERN TERRITORY THAN IT HAS TO LOSE FROM ADDITIONAL PACT ACCESS TO THE MORE OPEN SOCIETY OF

THE FRG.

7. DURATION OF INSPECTORATES. (PARA 7, REFTTEL A.) WE COULD AGREE TO A "RIGHT TO BE PRESENT" FORMULATION SO LONG AS IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WOULD WANT THE RIGHT EXERCISED ON WHAT WOULD AMOUNT TO A CONTINUOUS BASIS, AND WOULD EXPECT THE PACT TO DO THE SAME WITHOUT PROTEST FROM NATO.

8. SPECIFIC MEASURES AND CONCLUSIONS. IT LOOKS FROM HERE AS IF THE SPECIFIC MEASURES ARE DEVELOPING WELL. WE WOULD BE SATISFIED IF MOBILE TEAMS RECEIVE GREATEST EMPHASIS AND FIRST NEGOTIATING PRIORITY. BOTH IN PHASE I AND PHASE II, WE THINK THE EXISTENCE OF MOBILE TEAMS WOULD
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GIVE THE ALLIES GREATER ASSURANCE THAT REDUCTIONS -- ALONG WITH STABILIZING MEASURES - WERE BEING OBSERVED THAN WOULD STATIC POSTS, AND WOULD HOPE THE FRG WOULD COME TO SEE THIS. THUS, WE PREFER DELETION OF SECOND BRACKETED LANGUAGE IN PARA 30 OF REF B AND DELETIONS OF FIRST SENTENCE IN 3RD BRACKET OF PARA 38./ RUSH

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